



OWNER

Emergency Response Plan

Site-Specific Plan for the




Document No.: SAF-RPT-005

Rev. A, Issued for Review

Date: September 29, 2026

Project:



TORUS

, County,

N O T I C E

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ISSUE SUMMARY AND APPROVAL

This page records each issue of SAF-RPT-005. The preparer, reviewer and approver sign for each revision.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. PURPOSE

This plan sets out what the people who work at, monitor or respond to the () will do in an emergency. It is the site-specific part of the Owner's written emergency procedures required by 49 CFR 192.615. It is to be read with the Owner's company emergency manual, its public awareness program under 49 CFR 192.616 and its control room management plan under 49 CFR 192.631. Where the company manual and this plan differ on a matter specific to this station, this plan governs.

The station is unmanned. Most emergencies will first be seen by the Owner's gas controller at the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) host, and most on-site responses will be made by a single technician who has driven to site. The plan is written for those two people first, and for the emergency responders who will meet them at the gate.

1.2. SCOPE

The plan covers the fenced station between the inlet insulating joint IJ-101 and the outlet insulating joint IJ-102, the Owner's buried 12 in outlet lateral from IJ-102 to the receiving pipeline operator's tap valve, and the access road. It covers releases of gas and liquids, fire and explosion, operation of the station's emergency shutdown (ESD) and overpressure shutdown systems, natural hazards, security events and medical emergencies.

1.3. EXCLUSIONS

The following are outside this plan and are covered by the documents of the party that operates them:

- The Owner's upstream 12 in lateral and the treating and compression facility that feeds it. Isolation of the lateral is carried out at that facility.
- The receiving pipeline operator's hot tap, tap valve, remote shutoff and 24 in trunkline. , as the receiving pipeline operator, isolates its own facilities on the Owner's request.
- Utility power lines up to the station transformer XF-101.

1.4. STATUS

This plan is issued for review. Contact names and telephone numbers are shown as HOLD and will be completed by the Owner before startup; completion is a pre-startup safety review item in SAF-LST-001, Pre-Startup Safety Review Checklist. The plan takes effect when the Owner adopts it and the first drill has been held.

In every emergency the order of priority is people first, then the public, then the environment, then property and gas supply. This order follows 49 CFR 192.615(a)(5) and is not to be reversed to protect deliveries.

2. STATION DESCRIPTION

2.1. THE FACILITY


receives up to 120 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD) of treated, dehydrated natural gas from the Owner's upstream lateral, filters, meters, analyzes and heats it, controls its flow, and delivers it through a check valve into a trunkline operated by . The gas is sweet (hydrogen sulfide below 4 ppmv), lighter than air and flammable between about 4.5 and 15 % by volume in air. Station piping is designed for 1,440 psig and normally runs between 900 and 1,150 psig. The trunkline maximum allowable operating pressure is 1,200 psig (HOLD H-04). Table 2-1 summarizes what a responder needs to know about the site.

Table 2-1: Site Information for Responders

Item	Information
Location	County, , about 34.95 N, 97.93 W (HOLD H-02: surveyed coordinates and a 911 address)
Access	20 ft gravel road, about 600 ft, from the section-line county road to the east (HOLD H-05)
Gates	Main vehicle gate, east fence; emergency vehicle gate, west fence; personnel gates at the east fence near B-102 and on the north fence
Fenced area	250 ft east-west by 200 ft north-south; unmanned; monitored remotely by Owner gas control
Buildings	B-101 analyzer shelter near the center of the site; B-102 control and electrical building in the southeast corner
Fired equipment	H-101 indirect line heater, burner at the east end; G-101 standby generator beside B-102
Liquids	T-101, 100 bbl atmospheric tank (9 ft 6 in diameter by 8 ft) in a 24 ft by 24 ft containment at the west side, with truck stand to the north
Vent stack	VS-101, NPS 8 by 25 ft, northwest of the process area
Gas sources	Upstream lateral entering from the south; trunkline to the north through the outlet check valve CKV-171 and the buried outlet lateral
Neighbors	HOLD: residences, roads and places of assembly within the potential impact radius, from the Owner's public awareness survey

A laminated site plan showing gates, ESD pushbuttons, muster points, windsocks and the vent stack is kept in weatherproof boxes at both vehicle gates and inside B-102. The instrument location plan in Figure 2-1 shows the positions of the ESD pushbuttons and the major equipment.

Figure 2-1. Station Layout with ESD Pushbuttons and Detectors (INS-DWG-003, Sheet 1)



2.2. AUTOMATIC PROTECTION

Three automatic systems act before anyone reaches site, and a responder should know what they have already done.

The station ESD, interlock I-01 on the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), is started by any of the four ESD pushbuttons, confirmed gas in either building, fire detected at the heater, loss of 24 V control power, or a shutdown command from the receiving pipeline operator. It closes the inlet valve SDV-101, the overpressure valve SDV-102, the outlet valve SDV-103, the separator liquid valve SDV-106, the analyzer sample valve SDV-141 and the heater fuel valve SDV-165, trips the heater burner and drives both control valves closed. It does not blow down the station. Blowdown is a manual decision (Section 7). The generator fuel branch stays live so that standby power remains available to the control and safety systems; the generator has its own shutoff at the unit.

The overpressure shutdown system (OPSS), safety instrumented function SIF-01, closes SDV-102 and SDV-103 when two of the three outlet pressure transmitters read 1,225 psig or more. It protects the trunkline and trips independently of the control system.

The fire and gas system in the two buildings closes the sample valve, isolates non-rated power in B-101, stops the B-102 ventilation on gas at the air intake, and sounds beacons and a horn. Its logic is described in SAF-RPT-003, Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy and Layout.

3. ROLES AND NOTIFICATIONS

3.1. RECOGNIZING AN EMERGENCY

An emergency exists when any of the following is found or reported:

1. Gas odor, the sound of escaping gas, blowing dirt or dead vegetation at the station or along the outlet lateral.
2. Fire, explosion or smoke.
3. A station ESD, an OPSS trip, or a fire or gas alarm at SCADA.
4. An unexplained fall in inlet or outlet pressure that could indicate a rupture.
5. Excavation or other third-party damage near the station or lateral.
6. A tornado, severe storm, lightning strike on the facility, flood or earthquake.
7. An intrusion alarm with no visit scheduled.
8. An injury or medical emergency on site.

The Owner classifies each event by its effect so that the response and the notifications match it, as set out in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Emergency Classification

Level	Definition	Response
1	Minor event contained on site, no injury, no uncontrolled release	Owner field response and internal notification
2	Uncontrolled release, ESD or OPSS trip with a release, fire contained on site, or any injury	911 for fire or injury; Owner and gas control; regulatory screening
3	Fire or explosion, release affecting the public, fatality or hospitalization, evacuation beyond the fence	911 and every notification in Table 3-2; federal and state reports

3.2. ROLES

The Owner's gas controller is responsible for recognizing the event, starting a remote shutdown when needed and making the first notifications. The first Owner employee on site acts as incident commander until relieved by the on-call field supervisor. When a fire department arrives, the Owner's incident commander works in a unified command with the fire officer: the fire officer directs firefighting and public protection, and the Owner directs valve operation and isolation. Responders from other agencies do not operate station valves.

3.3. CONTACTS

The contacts in Table 3-2 are posted at each gate and in B-102. The Owner will complete the entries marked HOLD before startup and confirm them at every annual review.

Table 3-2: Emergency Contacts

Organization	Role in an emergency	Telephone
911, County emergency dispatch	Fire, ambulance, sheriff	911
Owner gas control (24 h)	Controller, remote ESD, first notifications	HOLD
Owner on-call field supervisor	Incident commander until relieved	HOLD
gas control (24 h)	Receiving pipeline operator; tap valve and remote shutoff	HOLD (H-14)
Owner upstream treating and compression facility	Isolation of the 12 in lateral	HOLD (H-16)
Local fire department	Firefighting and exposure protection	HOLD
County Emergency Management	County coordination, public warning	HOLD
County Sheriff	Traffic control and security	HOLD
, Pipeline Safety Department	State notification	HOLD
National Response Center	Federal immediate notice under 49 CFR 191.5	1-800-424-8802
Electric cooperative	Power isolation at XF-101	HOLD (H-10)
OKIE811	Locates and third-party damage	811
Nearest hospital	Medical	HOLD, with posted route
Owner environmental and regulatory	Spill and air reporting	HOLD

3.4. FIRST PERSON ON SITE

The first person on site, or the first to learn of an emergency, will take these steps in order.

1. Move upwind or crosswind to a muster point (Section 6). Do not operate switches, radios or vehicles inside a gas cloud.
2. If a release, fire or explosion is under way and an ESD pushbutton can be reached safely, press it. Otherwise ask Owner gas control to start a remote ESD.
3. Call 911 for any fire, explosion, injury or release that could affect the public.
4. Call Owner gas control and give your name, the station name, the gate you are at, what has happened, any injuries, the wind direction from the windsocks and what you have done.
5. Stay at the muster point, meet responders at the gate and brief the fire officer.

3.5. OWNER GAS CONTROLLER

The controller will take these steps. They satisfy the controller duties of 49 CFR 192.615(a)(11) and 192.631.

1. Acknowledge the priority 1 alarm and confirm the event from SCADA: the ESD first-out, fire and gas status, pressures and valve positions.
2. If no ESD has occurred and the event is confirmed, start the remote station ESD from SCADA.
3. Notify gas control at once. If the outlet lateral is involved, ask to close its tap valve and remote shutoff.
4. If the inlet section or the upstream lateral is involved, ask the upstream facility to stop delivery into the lateral.
5. Call 911 if it has not been done, and dispatch the on-call technician and supervisor.
6. Record the time of each action for the incident file.

Hold point: a rapid pressure fall on the inlet or outlet transmitters is treated as a potential rupture. The controller does not wait for field confirmation before completing isolation.

4. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN AND EVACUATION

4.1. ESD PUSHBUTTONS

Four latching ESD pushbuttons are provided, each at a point a person will pass while leaving the area it serves. Table 4-1 lists them.

Table 4-1: Station ESD Pushbuttons

Tag	Location
HS-201	Inside the main vehicle gate, east fence
HS-202	Outside the B-102 door
HS-203	West end of the meter skid, on the side away from the process piping
HS-204	West of line heater H-101, clear of the burner

A station ESD is reset only at the safety system panel in B-102 with the reset key, after the cause has been found and the incident commander agrees. The reset and restart sequence is in **INS-RPT-001**, Control Philosophy and Functional Narrative.

4.2. EVACUATION

On a gas alarm beacon, a fire, or the ESD horn, everyone leaves the fence by the nearest safe gate, crosswind of the release, and goes to a muster point. The route must not pass under the vent stack VS-101 or across the T-101 truck stand while the stack is venting. The technician's sign-in sheet in B-102 and the vehicle log are used to account for everyone.

5. SCENARIO PROCEDURES

5.1. GAS LEAK WITHOUT FIRE

1. Evacuate to the muster point and take portable monitor readings from upwind.
2. Keep vehicles and other ignition sources out of the cloud.
3. For a small leak at a flange or fitting that can be reached safely, isolate it at the nearest manual valve.
4. For a large or uncertain leak, start a station ESD and then blow down the affected section as set out in Section 7.

5.2. FIRE AT THE LINE HEATER OR ITS FUEL TRAIN

The heater-area flame detector BE-213 starts a station ESD automatically, which closes SDV-165 and the burner shutoff valves XV-150A, XV-150B and XV-150C.

1. Call 911 and evacuate.
2. Let a gas-fed fire burn until its fuel has been isolated. Extinguishing a gas jet fire before isolation leaves an unignited release that can find a worse ignition source.
3. Cool exposed equipment only from a safe distance, and only on the fire officer's instruction.
4. **Hold point:** blow down the meter and heater section through BDV-182 only when the incident commander decides it will reduce the hazard, and after confirming the fire is controlled.

5.3. GAS IN THE ANALYZER SHELTER

The detectors GD-205 and GD-206 close the sample valve SDV-141 and isolate non-rated power in B-101. Confirmed gas starts a station ESD.

1. Do not enter B-101.
2. Ventilate from outside by opening the door from the side with the fan running.
3. Re-enter only when the portable monitor reads below 10 % of the lower explosive limit (LEL).
4. Find and repair the sample system leak before the sample valve is reopened.

5.4. GAS AT THE CONTROL BUILDING OR SMOKE IN B-102

Gas at the B-102 air intake (GD-207) stops the ventilation; high-high gas starts a station ESD. Smoke (XS-212) also stops the ventilation.

1. Do not operate switchgear.
2. For smoke, call 911. Use the carbon dioxide extinguisher only on a small fire at its start.
3. For gas, find the outdoor source, which is most likely in the outlet valve area, and isolate it.

5.5. OVERPRESSURE SHUTDOWN TRIP

An OPSS trip without a release is not an evacuation event.

1. Owner gas control informs .
2. The cause, normally an upstream pressure excursion or a control failure, is found and corrected before any reset.
3. **Hold point:** the OPSS is reset only locally at the key switch HS-102 beside SDV-102, following INS-RPT-001. A restart is witnessed by if the Interconnect Agreement requires it (HOLD H-01).

5.6. STATION ESD FROM ANY CAUSE

1. Confirm the cause from the first-out display at SCADA or on the safety system panel in B-102.
2. Confirm that every shutdown valve has closed from its closed-position indication.
3. Blow down only if needed (Section 7).
4. Notify before any restart.

5.7. THIRD-PARTY DAMAGE

1. Stop the work, and evacuate if gas is escaping.
2. Call Owner gas control and 811.
3. If the outlet lateral is damaged, start a station ESD, ask to close its tap valve, and blow down the lateral through HV-172A and RO-172B once confirms the tap valve is closed.
4. Inspect the pipe before backfill, and report if the reporting criteria are met.

5.8. TORNADO AND SEVERE STORM

The site has no storm shelter. Technicians monitor National Weather Service warnings, do not start work while a watch is in force, and leave before a storm arrives. The station continues to run under remote monitoring. After the storm, the site is checked for gas and downed lines before anyone enters.

5.9. LIGHTNING

Technicians stay outside the fence during thunderstorms. A strike can ignite gas at the vent stack tip. A stack fire is left to burn out or is snuffed with nitrogen through the purge connection HV-180B by trained personnel. Cathodic protection and the insulating joints are checked after a storm.

5.10. EARTHQUAKE

Central experiences induced seismicity. After a felt event, SCADA pressures are reviewed and the site is inspected for leaks with a portable monitor. Damaged sections are isolated.

5.11. SECURITY BREACH

Intruders are not confronted. The technician calls 911 and Owner gas control. If tampering with valves is suspected, the controller starts a remote ESD. A suspected cyber incident is handled under the incident response plan in INS-RPT-002, SCADA, Communications and Cybersecurity.

5.12. MEDICAL EMERGENCY

Call 911, give first aid, and meet the ambulance at the main gate. The route to the nearest hospital is posted in B-102 (HOLD).

5.13. T-101 SPILL OR OVERFILL

The high-high level switch LSHH-192 closes SDV-106 and stops inflow to the tank. Spilled liquid stays inside the containment and is removed by vacuum truck. Ignition sources are kept away, and the Owner's environmental group decides on any report.

6. MUSTER POINTS

Two muster points are provided so that one is always upwind or crosswind of the process area. Both are outside the fence so that responders meet the technician before entering. Table 6-1 gives their positions, measured from the southwest fence corner, as established in SAF-RPT-004, Facility Siting and Spacing Review.

Table 6-1: Muster Points

Muster point	Position	When to use
MP-1, primary	On the access road about 30 ft east of the main gate	Default for the prevailing south (summer) and north (winter) winds, which are crosswind of the process area; responders arrive here
MP-2, alternate	Outside the lease, west of the emergency gate	Wind from the east, or when the east side is blocked by fire at H-101, B-102 or G-101

Both windsocks are checked before a muster point is chosen.

7. ISOLATION AND MANUAL BLOWDOWN

A station ESD divides the station into isolated sections but does not depressure them. Blowdown is manual and is done only when the incident commander judges that it reduces the hazard, for example for a leak that cannot be stopped or a section exposed to fire.

The sections are blown down one at a time. VS-101 is sized for one section; opening two blowdown paths together would overload it, and a stack for simultaneous blowdown would need to be about 43 ft tall rather than 25 ft. Each section is completed and its blowdown valve closed before the next is started. No truck may be at the T-101 truck stand while the stack is venting, because the stand lies inside the heat radiation contour of an ignited vent (SAF-RPT-004).

Hold point: before opening any blowdown valve, the incident commander confirms that nobody is within about 110 ft of VS-101 and that the wind will carry the vent away from people.

The sequence in Table 7-1 is followed as far as the incident requires.

Table 7-1: Section Isolation and Blowdown Sequence

Step	Section	Boundary valves confirmed closed	Blowdown valve (open slowly)	Confirm by
1	Whole station	SDV-101, SDV-102, SDV-103, SDV-106, SDV-165	None	Pressures steady at SCADA
2	Inlet section to the meter inlet	SDV-101; upstream lateral isolated at the upstream facility if the leak is upstream of SDV-101	BDV-181 through RO-181	PI-101, PI-103 falling
3	Meter and heater section	Meter run valves as found; SDV-102	BDV-182 through RO-182	PI-113, PI-156A falling
4	Control valve outlet header	Both control valves closed; SDV-102	HV-133D	PI-137 falling
5	Between SDV-102 and SDV-103	SDV-102 and SDV-103	BDV-183 through RO-183	PI-138 falling
6	Outlet lateral to the tap valve	SDV-103, and the tap valve closed and confirmed by	HV-172A through RO-172B	PI-174 falling
7	Pig receiver PR-101, if involved	Receiver isolation valves	BDV-102 through RO-102	PI-102 at 0 psig before the closure is touched

Note 1: CKV-171 prevents reverse flow from the trunkline but is not a positive isolation. The outlet lateral is never blown down until has confirmed its tap valve closed.

Note 2: Vent piping can become very cold from expansion cooling. Blowdown valves are opened slowly and the vent piping is not touched.

Note 3: After any event that may have put liquid into the stack, the stack base drain valve HV-180A is opened to a portable collection pan, which is emptied by vacuum truck.

8. RESTORING SERVICE

Service is restored as required by 49 CFR 192.615(a)(9), in this order:

1. The incident commander declares the emergency over, the cause has been found and repaired, and affected equipment has been inspected and, where required, pressure tested.
2. Any section opened to air is purged with gas or nitrogen under the Owner's purging procedure before it is pressured.
3. The safety system is reset locally. The shutdown valves are reset in the order SDV-103, SDV-102, SDV-101, and each is equalized first through its bypass valve HV-103H, HV-102H or HV-101H, so that no valve is opened against full differential pressure.
4.
 agrees to resume receipt and sets its flow permissive.
5. The station is restarted under the normal startup procedure and the startup permissives in
 INS-RPT-001.
6. The restoration is recorded in the incident file.



9. RESOURCES ON SITE

The equipment in Table 9-1 is kept at the station or carried by the responding technician, as required by 49 CFR 192.615(a)(4).

Table 9-1: Emergency Resources

Resource	Location	Quantity
Portable four-gas monitor (LEL, oxygen, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulfide)	Carried by each technician	2 in the site kit
Fire extinguisher, 20 lb dry chemical	B-101 door, B-102 door, heater burner end, meter skid, fuel gas skid, T-101 loadout	6
Fire extinguisher, 10 lb carbon dioxide	Inside B-102	1
First aid kit and eyewash	B-102	1
Windsock	B-102 roof and near the west gate	2
Site plan and this plan	Weatherproof boxes at both vehicle gates and in B-102	3
Nitrogen for stack snuffing	Brought by the Owner response crew	As needed
Barricade tape, signs and cones	Owner response vehicle	As needed
Response contractors (welding, excavation, vacuum truck)	Owner call-out list	HOLD



10. LIAISON WITH EMERGENCY OFFICIALS

Before startup the Owner will meet the local fire department, County Emergency Management and the sheriff to describe the station and its hazards, give them this plan and the site plan, and arrange gate access through a key box or lock code at the main gate (HOLD). The Owner will explain that responders should not operate station valves because the Owner can shut the station down remotely, agree the thresholds for mutual notification, and plan mutual assistance. The fire department will be asked not to extinguish a burning gas release before its fuel is isolated, and to cool exposures such as T-101 and B-101 from a safe distance.

The liaison will be repeated at least once a year and after any significant change to the station, and records will be kept. The station is included in the Owner's public awareness program under 49 CFR 192.616 for the affected public, emergency officials, local public officials and excavators.



11. REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION

The Owner's regulatory group makes the reports listed in Table 11-1. The triggers and deadlines are summarized here for the technician's awareness and must be confirmed against the regulations in force.

Table 11-1: Reporting Requirements

Report	Trigger	Timing	Responsible
National Response Center (49 CFR 191.5)	Incident as defined in 49 CFR 191.3	As soon as practicable, and within one hour of confirmed discovery; update within 48 hours	Owner regulatory
 	As required by 165:20	Telephone notice as required, then written follow-up	Owner regulatory
PHMSA incident report (49 CFR 191.15)	Incident	Within 30 days	Owner regulatory
Safety-related condition (49 CFR 191.23 and 191.25)	Condition meeting 191.23	Within 5 working days of determination	Owner regulatory
	Every ESD, OPSS trip, release or gas quality shut-in	At once by telephone; written as the Interconnect Agreement requires (HOLD H-01)	Owner gas control
Environmental	As required by the Owner's program and DEQ	As required	Owner environmental

After any failure that caused or could have caused an incident, the Owner will investigate under 49 CFR 192.617, preserve failed parts and apply the lessons learned. After each emergency the supervisor will review what employees did against this plan, as 49 CFR 192.615(b)(3) requires, and record any improvement.

12. TRAINING, DRILLS AND PLAN REVIEW

Every person sent to
 will be trained on this plan, qualified under the Owner's operator qualification program (49 CFR 192 Subpart N) for the tasks performed, and trained to use the portable monitor and extinguishers. Supervisors hold a current copy of the plan, and training is verified through drill performance and records.

A tabletop exercise with
 gas control and the local fire department will be held before startup. At least one exercise will be held each year after that, and it will include a remote ESD from SCADA. The plan will be reviewed at least once a year, after each drill or emergency, and after any change to equipment, access, contacts or muster points. Each review is recorded.



13. OPEN ITEMS

The plan cannot be adopted until the following items are closed:

- H-02: surveyed coordinates and a 911 address (Owner).
- H-05: access road and gate arrangement (Owner, County).
- H-10: electric cooperative contact (Owner).
- H-01 and H-14: gas control contact, remote shutoff arrangement and notification requirements (Owner,).
- H-16: upstream facility contact and isolation arrangement (Owner).
- HOLD: every contact in Table 3-2, the neighbor survey, the hospital route and the gate key box (Owner).



APPENDIX A. COMPLIANCE WITH 49 CFR 192.615






Table A-1 shows where this plan meets each element of 49 CFR 192.615. Paragraph numbering is to be confirmed against the edition in force, because recent rulemaking on rupture detection added paragraphs.

Table A-1: 49 CFR 192.615 Cross-Reference

Paragraph	Requirement	Where addressed
(a)(1)	Receiving, identifying and classifying notices of events needing immediate response	Section 3.1
(a)(2)	Communication with fire, police and public officials	Sections 3.3, 10
(a)(3)	Prompt response to gas in or near a building, fire, explosion and natural disaster	Section 5
(a)(4)	Availability of personnel, equipment, tools and materials	Section 9
(a)(5)	Protecting people first, then property	Section 1.4
(a)(6)	Emergency shutdown and pressure reduction	Sections 4, 7
(a)(7)	Making safe any hazard to life or property	Sections 5, 7
(a)(8)	Notifying officials and coordinating responses	Sections 3.3, 3.4, 10
(a)(9)	Safely restoring service	Section 8
(a)(10)	Beginning a failure investigation under 192.617	Section 11
(a)(11)	Controller actions during an emergency (192.631)	Section 3.5
Rupture provisions	Rupture identification and prompt isolation	Section 3.5 hold point; Owner company manual
(b)(1)	Supervisors hold a current copy	Section 12
(b)(2)	Training and verification of effectiveness	Section 12
(b)(3)	Review of employee actions after an emergency	Section 11
(c)(1) to (4)	Liaison with fire, police and public officials	Section 10

APPENDIX B. FIRE AND GAS DETECTOR LAYOUT





F&G ACTION SUMMARY (SAFETY PLC CP-102B)

CAUSE	SETPOINT / VOTE	ACTION
GD-205 OR GD-206 HIGH	20 % LEL, 1oo2	ALARM P2, XY-214A BEACON
GD-205 OR GD-206 HIGH-HIGH	40 % LEL, 1oo2	CLOSE SDV-141, XY-214D B-101 POWER OFF
B-101 CONFIRMED GAS	40 % + OTHER >= 20 %	ABOVE + STATION ESD, XY-214B
GD-207 HIGH	20 % LEL	XY-214C HVAC OFF, DAMPER CLOSED
GD-207 HIGH-HIGH	40 % LEL	STATION ESD, XY-214B
XS-212 SMOKE	1oo1	ALARM P1, XY-214C HVAC OFF
BE-213 FIRE	1oo1, 3 S CONFIRM	STATION ESD, XY-214B
FSL-208 AIRFLOW LOW	30 S	ALARM P2; XY-214D AFTER 5 MIN
DETECTOR FAULT	< 3.0 MA	ALARM P2, NO TRIP

LEGEND

	POINT IR COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTOR	YELLOW = SIS EQUIPMENT
	DETECTOR / TRANSMITTER (SMOKE, FLAME, TEMP)	DASHED = BY OTHERS / NOT IN SCOPE
	ESD PUSHBUTTON	
	BEACON / HORN	
	SHUTDOWN VALVE	

NOTES / REFERENCES

- NATURAL GAS IS LIGHTER THAN AIR: SHELTER DETECTORS AT CEILING (MAX 12 IN BELOW), ABOVE LEAK SOURCES.
 - SETPOINTS 20 / 40 % LEL (METHANE CAL.). ACTIONS PER LST-004; STATION ESD = P&ID INTERLOCK I-01.
 - B-101 VENTILATION >= 192 CFM (12 ACH, 8 FT INTERIOR ASSUMED); FAN 250 CFM (SAF-RPT-003).
 - BE-213 MOUNTED 10 FT ABOVE GRADE, AIMED DOWN AT FUEL TRAIN; SIGHT PORTS > 45 DEG OFF DETECTOR AXIS.
 - H-101 PER PLOT PLAN MEC-DWG-001. SDV-141 CLOSURES ON STATION ESD.
 - LOCATIONS PRELIMINARY; FINAL BY VENDOR SHELTER / BUILDING DRAWINGS (HOLD H-15).
- REF: SAF-RPT-003, INS-DWG-003

REVISIONS

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	BY	CHK	APP
A	2026-09-29	ISSUED FOR REVIEW (IFR)			

PRELIMINARY - ISSUED FOR REVIEW - NOT FOR CONSTRUCTION

ENGINEER OF RECORD SEAL

NOT SEALED
PRELIMINARY

PE NO. _____

PROJECT

120 MMSCFD RECEIPT INTO _____
COUNTY, _____
DISCIPLINE: PROCESS SAFETY
SCALE: AS SHOWN

FIRE AND GAS DETECTOR LAYOUT

B-101, B-102 AND H-101 BURNER END
DRAWN: _____ CHECKED: _____ APPROVED: _____
DWG NO. SAF-DWG-001
SHEET 1 OF 1 REV A